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Abstract
Bioterrorism has become a greater concern for Americans
since the 2001 anthrar: letters. Recent studies have explored the
possibilities of biological attacks, and most deal with possible
large-scale attacks. However, there is reason to believe that
small-scale attacks are more likely. Even though there have
been investigations of the postal delivery system and the spread
ofbioagents through mail, few if any studies have looked at
an attack on a single building and the resultant spread from
room to room. One particular method ofattacking a building
would be a single-event release of an aerosol bioagent in the
building. This paper describes the development of a method
for stud_ving the spread of an aerosol throughout a building in
order to determine what factors most affect the time between
release and the lethal exposure for an occupant in various
locations. A multi-zone airflow model, CONTAM, was used to
simulate and compare the effects of the air handling system
operation, door position, building level, predominant wind
direction, and other factors. It was found that the air handling
system, building floor level, and door position changed the
time to lethal exposure. For the scenarios investigated, lethal
exposure times rangedfrom 5 seconds to nearly 15 minutes,
and the air handling system was found to have the greatest
effect on a contaminants spread through a building.
Introduction
Throughout history, biological weapons have been used to
wage war. One of the earliest and possibly deadliest examples
occurred in the mid-1300s in Kaffa as bubonic plague victims
of the Tartar army were catapulted over the city walls. Some
believe that this is what led to the epidemic throughout
medieval Europe that killed 25 million. The twentieth century
saw the rise of research into biowarfare among nations across
the world. This led to the signing of the 1972 Biological
Weapons Convention, which forbids research with oflensive
biological agents and stockpiling bioweapons for military
purposes [ 1].
Bioterrorism has become a concern for everyday
Americans following the September 11, 2001 attacks on the
World Trade Center. The first incidents involving anthrax
occurred on September 25, 200 I, when an assistant to Tom
Brokaw (NBC anchorman) began to develop cutaneous
anthrax after handling a letter containing anthrax powder. By

November 2, 200 I, the Center for Disease Control (CDC) had
reported 21 cases of anthrax -16 confirmed and 5 suspected
[2]. Anthrax is classified as a Category A bioterrorism agent.
There are three categories of possible bioterrorist diseases
or agents. Category A Diseases/Agents are the highest
priority risks. These agents are the worst because they can be
transmitted easily, result in high mortality rates, have potential
for major public health impacts, and require special action for
public health preparedness. Currently there are six listed by
the CDC in Category A: Anthrax, Botulism, Plague, Smallpox,
Tularemia, and Viral Hemorrhagic Fevers. Category B
Diseases/ Agents are moderately easy to disseminate, have low
mortality rates, and require enhanced disease surveillance by
the CDC. Category C Diseases/ Agents are those considered to
be available for mass dissemination, are easily produced, and
have potential for high mortality rates. [3)
A large-scale release into the atmosphere or over a large
city is greatly feared. For example, the release of I 00 kg of
anthrax over a large city could kill millions [4]. Large-scale
attacks have been attempted by terrorists in the past, but all
have failed. For instance, the Japanese doomsday cult Aum
Shinrikyo failed on ten separate occasions at an open-air urban
attack of anthrax or botulism, despite having considerable
wealth and scientific capabilities. In March of 1995, the cult
eventually killed 12 people through the release of sarin nerve
gas in a Tokyo subway. Experts believe that in the near term, it
is considered more likely that terrorist attacks will be smallscale attempts or merely hoaxes. [5]
Problem Statement
The misuse of a building's ventilation system to spread
a biological agent throughout a building is a real possibility
[6]. The purpose of this study was to simulate various smallscale attack scenarios on a typical 'office' building. The time
between bioagent release and the time at which an occupant is
exposed to a lethal dose were compared for various scenarios.
In addition, the importance of building related factors such
as air handling system (AHS) operation, building floor level,
door position (open or closed), and predominant wind direction
were analyzed.
ll.fodeling 1Uethod
The use of airflow model techniques was determined to
be the best approach for this undergraduate research project.
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were based on an inhalation rate of20 m3/day [15, 16] and a
The National Institute of Science and Technology developed
mean lethal dose (LD50) ofO.Ol micrograms. The LD50 value
and maintains a model that was originally designed to analyze
chosen was calculated for Inhalation Anthrax from the low end
building ventilation and indoor air quality issues. This
of the University of Alabama, Birmingham's LD50 estimate
computer simulation model is known as CONTAM and is a
of a 10,000-20,000 spores [16] and Ed Lake's concentration
multizone airflow and contaminant transport model capable
estimate of one trillion spores per gram [17]. For the
of determining zonal airflows, contaminant concentrations,
calculations, a I% solution was assumed for the aerosol device,
and personal exposures rates [7]. Using CONTAM to
so the times until lethal exposure were based on l microgram
evaluate potential building terrorism is a logical extension
of aerosol exposure.
of its application. It has more recently been considered an
appropriate tool for such building simulations [8-11]. Other
Results and Discussion
published works [12-14], only somewhat related, are recent
studies on exposure to passengers, airflow and pathogen
Lethal Exposure Time:s
transport within aircraft cabins.
Table I contains the resulting times until lethal exposure
For this study, a simple building was sketched to model
(LD50) for each of the 16 simulations. The table is organized
several different scenarios. The building is two stories tall
based on where the contaminant was released (office or
with both floors having a large open space in the center that is
maintenance), where exposure was calculated for an occupant
meant to represent a cubicle area. On each floor and along the
(lst floor office, etc.) and whether the doors in the building
two opposite sides, are smaller rooms representing individual
were open or closed. The data are listed in minute:second (mm:
offices. In Figure I, the CONTAM sketches for each floor are
ss) format.
shown. CONTAM inputs included sizes for walls, ducts, and
For each room, the contaminant level and exposure level
airflow paths (windows, doors, wall leakages, cracks, etc.).
had similarly shaped curves as functions of time. Figures
Mechanical systems such as ducts, fans, and zone sizes are also 2a-b are representative: Figure 2a is for the scenario in which
inputs. In addition, information on the tracked contaminants
the biocontaminant originated in a lst floor office and all
(i.e., biological agents)
doors were open with
was input along with
exposure measured in
the location and
the 1st floor cubicle
method of entering the
area. Figure 2b displays
building.
similar conditions
Depending on
except the contaminant
the scenario, a burst
originates in the l st
contaminant source
floor maintenance
First Floor
Second Floor
was placed in either
Figure I. CONTAM two-story office building sketch with indicated release (A: I st floor room. Note that the
a I st floor office
office and B: I st floor maintenance room) and exposure (I: I st floor office, 2: 2nd floor
graphs are given over a
(location A) or a 1st office, 3: 1st floor cubical area. and 4: 2nd floor cubical area) locations.CONTAM
much larger time range
floor maintenance
than the time required to lethal exposure.
room (location B). The source considered was an aerosol burst
of0.4 kg contaminant into the model at 10:00 AM. Simulations
Building Factors:
were run with doors in the building either all open or all closed.
The effect of the AHS can be seen by comparing exposure
Exposure results were calculated in 1st and 2nd floor offices
times between scenarios with the contaminant originating
(locations 1-2) and in 1st and 2nd floor cubicle areas (locations in the maintenance room (with no ventilation) and the office
3-4), resulting
(having ventilation). For
Table l. Time to lethal Exposure (mm:ss)
in a total of 16
an exposure in the same
Exposure Location
simulated scenarios.
1 Floor Cubicles 2 Floor Office
room,
it would take 5 to
2'''
(;Iocr Cub~~les
1((0:~o~~~
(location 3)
{location 2\
Location 4
The burst source is
14 times as long for a
Closed
Closed
Doors Ocen/Ciosed: Ocen
Ooen
Ocen Closed
Closed
Ocen
00:10
00:55
00:40
00:35
Contaminant
Office 00:40
00:05
1:25
01:05
representative of
lethal dose to be reached
Origin Mamtanence 04:40
00:55
08:35
08:05
06:10
00:45
12:35
14:45
an aerosol release
when the contaminant
of a bioagent.
burst originated in the maintenance room as compared to the
The office was chosen to represent a release location with
office. For contaminants originating in the office, the longest
full air-conditioning ventilation and return; in contrast, the
time to lethal exposure was l minute 25 seconds, occurring in
maintenance room has no air-conditioning ventilation or return. the second floor cubical area with all doors open. No matter
CONTAM exports results for simulated bioagent
the scenario, a release in the office had some of the agent
concentrations for every zone at each time step. Five second
immediately dra>vn into the AHS and quickly distributed
increments were chosen as the time step for these simulations
throughout the building. The worst maintenance room release
and found generally to capture the lethal exposure time
case occurred with all doors open. The time to lethal exposure
scale. To determine exposure for a person in each room, a
time was 45 seconds in the adjoining cubicle area. For most
https://scholarworks.uark.edu/inquiry/vol9/iss1/7
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spreadsheet was used to integrate the data. These calculations
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was due to the fact that some of the contaminant
escaped through open office door (into the cubical
area), leaving less to enter the AHS which supplies
the rest of the building.
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Conclusions and Recommendations
Simulations for common elements of a twostory office building computed times for occupant
lethal exposure that ranged from a few seconds to
Time
Time
just over 14 mmutes. Shorter times corresponded to
Figure 2a. Contaminant concentration and exposure le\el vs. time for l " floor office release to Is' floor cubicles
open rooms on the same floor and near the release.
exposure.
Longer times to lethal exposure corresponded to
rooms on floors different from the release pomt and
Concentration Level
Exposure Level
when the contaminant was released from rooms
without ventilation. The study shows the critical
nature and importance of protecting against small..,
scale bioterror attacks in buildings. This means that
<
en
.€.·
E"
an increased ability to detect b10agents is needed.
E'
Sensing technologies must be developed to detect
quickly various agents at low concentrations. In the
event of a biological release in a building, it is clear
"00
that one operating strategy is to shut off AHS as
Time
Time
soon as a threat is detected.
Figure 2b. Contaminant concentration and exposure level vs. time for 1~~ floor maintenance release to I~~ floor
cubicles exposure.
Many effects that were not considered in
this
study
could be further studied with CONTAM.
maintenance release cases, however, several minutes passed
These include the effects of outside windows, shutting off an
before lethal exposure time was reached. This was because
AHS after release of an agent, filters and filter efficiencies,
the contaminant would have to first exit the maintenance room
multiple AHS within a building, etc. To be fully prepared for
before it could be spread through the building within the AHS.
the type of bioterrorist attack examined in this study, a model
The AHS was the most dominant factor; however, the
of a specific building should be made, and multiple scenarios
level (or floor) an occupant is on (relative to the contaminant
should be run for that particular building to determme what
release location) was also found to be important. The longest
procedures will minimize the occupant's exposures.
time until lethal exposure occurred when burst contaminant
originated in the maintenance room. Of course, the longer
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